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Abstract. In this paper, we argue that to reverse the excess of specialization and to 
create room for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, it seems necessary to move the 
existing epistemic plurality towards a collaborative process of social cognition. In 
order to achieve this, we propose to extend the psychological notion of joint atten-
tion towards what we call joint intellectual attention. This special kind of joint atten-
tion involves a shared awareness of sharing the cognitive process of knowledge. We 
claim that if an interdisciplinary research team aspires to work collaboratively, it is 
essential for the researchers to jointly focus their attention towards a common ob-
ject and establish a second-person relatedness among them. We consider some of 
the intellectual dispositions or virtues fostered by joint intellectual attention that 
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facilitate interdisciplinary exchange and explore some of the practical consequen-
ces of this cognitive approach to interdisciplinarity for education and research. 
Keywords: interdisciplinary research; epistemic pluralism; intellectual collaborative 
work; social cognition; joint attention; second-person relatedness.
Introduction
As with the aim of universal peace on earth, today, it is almost undis-
puted that interdisciplinarity is of value and should be promoted. It is 
presumed that interdisciplinarity is a fruitful means by which to obtain 
new ideas, even in our own disciplines, as it assists in the improvement of 
social cohesion and communication, and it helps us become more intel-
lectually complete. However, like universal world peace, interdisciplinary 
research is an aspiration that is rarely fulfilled. 
There are several reasons for this lack of fulfilment. The volume of 
available data is overwhelming and mitigates our mastery of information, 
even within a single discipline. Furthermore, in the interdisciplinary re-
search, new risks of possible mistakes arise, such as epistemic trespass-
ing (Ballantyne 2019). In addition, the universalization of worldviews is 
inherent to many disciplines (or subdisciplines), not only with regard to 
content but also because many forms of disciplinary – and subdiscipli-
nary– thinking are totalizing. Thus, there can be a lack of knowledge or 
willingness to learn about other worldviews and ways of thinking. 
Nevertheless, some interdisciplinary research initiatives take place 
all around the world. Since 2010, for example, several research projects 
involving physicists, biologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, philoso-
phers and theologians have been continuously developed in Argentina. 
Through these projects, the research teams have tried different ways to 
promote collaborative work between university scholars with diverse aca-
demic backgrounds.
The most paradigmatic result of these initiatives is the book ¿Deter-
minismo o Indeterminismo? Grandes preguntas de las ciencias a la filosofía 
[Determinism or Indeterminism? Big Questions from the Sciences to Philos-
ophy] (Vanney and Franck 2016). Each of the eighteen chapters that con-
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stitute the book is focused on a question that simultaneously requires 
and exceeds a purely empirical approach, and is the object of study by 
a  team comprising a scientist (a physicist, a biologist or a neuroscien-
tist) and a  philosopher. In this way, each chapter involved  collabora-
tions between coauthors who have, in the past, published in different 
domains.1 The dialogue between them reached a climax in three work-
shops that were held at Austral University (Argentina) in 2013, 2014 and 
2015, but this dialogue was not limited to the workshops. Prior to the 
meetings, each pair of researchers began an exchange of ideas to pre-
pare their presentations. During the workshop sessions, the various top-
ics were discussed in depth. Finally, after the meeting, each pair of re-
searchers continued working in collaboration until they assembled an 
integrated interdisciplinary document. This process required each pair 
of researchers to reach a heterogeneous conceptual consensus – in Hanne 
Andersen’s words (Andersen 2010)– combining their individual knowl-
edge to generate a cognitive output that they could not have produced 
alone. Thus, for at least a year, two researchers with different discipli-
nary training were encouraged to jointly focus their attention on a com-
mon question proposed to both.
Thi s methodology of collaborative work faced a number of difficulties 
related to the interaction between specialists and the reciprocal evalu-
ation of their different points of view. While the willingness of the re-
searchers made it possible to successfully conclude the book, many of 
them later stated that the process of joint writing involved a much great-
er effort than initially planned. The intended interdisciplinary collabo-
ration between philosophy and science admittedly challenged everyone, 
given that each researcher was used to work only within the framework of 
a theoretical doctrine with its own methods and procedures. The lack of 
knowledge of many empirical details challenged the philosophers, whilst 
the sophistication of the underlying philosophical discussions challenged 
1  In a study carried out by Bergmann, Dale, Sattari, Heit and Bhat a metric for interdis-
ciplinarity based on co-author publication history is proposed. They considered that 
“a published article that has co-authors with quite different publication histories can be 
deemed relatively “interdisciplinary,” in that the article reflects a convergence of previ-
ous research in distinct sets of publication outlets” (Bergmann et al. 2017), 1412). 
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the scientists. Moreover, since many terms change meaning according 
to the disciplinary context, the problem of communicating adequately 
proved to be considerable for all.
Experiences such as these confirm that interdisciplinary research is 
possible but not easy. Probably one of its main difficulties, and the cause 
of many others, lies in the fact that during the development of interdisci-
plinary research, many dissimilar cognitive methodologies are used. 
Alister McGrath (2019) explored these difficulties in a recent book The 
Territories of Human Reason. Science and Theology in an Age of Multiple Ra-
tionalities. After distinguishing different modes of rationality and their 
attendant practices across disciplinary fields, he highlighted a key point: 
The “multiplicity of research methods leads to a corresponding plurality 
of perspectives or insights, which thus require to be integrated, coordi-
nated, or colligated in order to allow the best possible overall represen-
tation of nature” (p. 210). He concluded the book with an open question: 
“How can we reverse the excesses of specialization and create room for 
interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary cross-fertilization?”, suggesting 
the following answer: “One route is through the cultivation of epistemic 
dependence, in which multiple thinkers bring about a shared expansion 
of a group’s vision” (p. 226).
We expand upon that idea in this paper and propose a way to move 
from epistemic plurality towards a collaborative process involving social 
cognition.2 Since it’s not the disciplines that actually dialogue, but indi-
viduals, in order to understand interdisciplinary work, we suggest deep-
ening the study of one of the most basic dispositions that enable the de-
velopment of interpersonal relationships or second-person relatedness: 
the psychological phenomenon of joint attention. We will examine this 
phenomenon and suggest extending it to a joint intellectual attention, to 
account for the dynamics of interdisciplinary research, and to explore 
2  Social cognition focuses on the role played by cognitive processes in social interac-
tions. According to Bodenhausen and Todd (2010) “social cognition researchers seek to 
identify the mental structures and processes that permit humans to navigate their so-
cial worlds successfully by understanding the psychological states (beliefs, emotions, 
goals, and so on) and traits (stable dispositions) of the persons they encounter and with 
whom they are interdependent” (p. 160). 
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new paths to promote it. Thus, in the following sections, we propose and 
explain four theses:
 1. Interdisciplinary research is a practice that, without denying the 
individual identity of the disciplines involved or pretending to 
transcend them, results in the production of new knowledge with 
insights from different fields. On the one hand, it is different from 
multidisciplinary research because it brings forth an integrated vi-
sion. On the other hand, it differs from transdisciplinary research 
because it avoids disciplinary integration achieved at a higher me-
ta-level through a process of generalization.
 2. The ultimate epistemic justification of the plurality of methodolo-
gies involved in interdisciplinary research is the cognitive richness 
of the human being, who is capable of exercising his or her ration-
ality in many ways. Disciplinary training develops a specific set of 
cognitive resources in researchers. However, interdisciplinary re-
search also demands the development of the ability to consider the 
topics from perspectives that are different from one’s own. A pro-
cess of social cognition among researchers of the work team facili-
tates this objective. 
 3. Because social cognition is built on the capacity to engage with oth-
er people’s attention, we propose to extend the psychological notion 
of joint attention towards joint intellectual attention, offering a cog-
nitive approach from a second-person perspective to understanding 
the dynamics of interdisciplinary research groups.
 4. Joint intellectual attention fosters intellectual dispositions or vir-
tues for interdisciplinary research.
We conclude this paper by considering some possible consequences of 
this cognitive approach to interdisciplinary research for education, teach-
ing programs, researchers, and project planning.
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1. What is interdisciplinary research?
 In the last fifty years, excessive specialization has exacerbated concerns 
related to the fragmentation of knowledge. In this context, internation-
al organizations, such as the OECD and UNESCO, have promoted a wid-
er approach among researchers from different disciplines. The notions 
of multidisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, which 
are now common in academic fields and apply to both teaching and re-
search, have developed as a result of this effort (Apostel et al. 1972; Na-
tional Academy of Science 2005; Thompson Klein 2017).3
Although there is no single definition of these notions (Austin et al. 
1996, Alvargonzález 2011), multidisciplinary work is characterized by the 
incorporation of contributions from various disciplines. During the de-
velopment of a multidisciplinary research, researchers use the method 
of their own discipline to investigate an object in an autonomous way. 
The final result of this type of work broadens the horizon of information 
by incorporating a diversity of disciplinary contributions. But, because it 
consists of a juxtaposition of results obtained in an independent process, 
their conclusions lack a deep unity. In this juxtaposition, the disciplines 
remain clearly separate, and their original identities remain unques-
tioned. The treatment of the same question from diverse perspectives but 
in a consecutive way allows us to recognize the multidisciplinary charac-
ter of this kind of research. That is, multidisciplinary research does not 
seek to integrate information but to give a comprehensive collection of 
information from different disciplines on a  subject (Pohl, Truffer, and 
Hirsch Hardorn 2017, 322).
Transdisciplinary work, instead, represents the greatest degree of 
cross-disciplinary integration (Hall et al. 2017, 342). Transdisciplinary 
research creates new approaches to address a scientific problem based on 
a shared conceptual framework or on a unified system of axioms as a re-
sult of a global synthesis at a general meta-level, transcending the scope 
3 In April 2018, the OECD published a position paper outlining the nature of the Future 
of Education 2030 project, including disciplinary and interdisciplinary knowledge. 
Cf. http://www.oecd.org/education/2030/oecd-education-2030-position-paper.pdf
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of disciplinary views. Transdisciplinary proposals are strong theoretical 
proposals which promote the application of a unique methodology, corre-
sponding to a level of generality superior to that of the disciplines partic-
ipating in the research, whereby their respective contributions are con-
sidered particular cases of the unifying metadiscipline. In other words, 
in transdisciplinarity, the results gain in integration and in generality, 
but disciplinary distinctions are lost in favour of a meta-level approach. 
Among the transdisciplinary proposals in science and philosophy we can 
include very different ones, such us diverse monistic unifications of an 
idealistic nature (Griffin 2008), or varied scientific reductionisms (De 
Ridder, Peels, and Woudenberg 2018).
In contrast, in interdisciplinary research, experts from different disci-
plines work in a joint, not independent, manner on a common problem. 
It is a research practice that, without denying the individual identity of 
the disciplines, nor pretending to transcend them, aims at the produc-
tion of new knowledge thanks to the shared effort of academics with dif-
ferent backgrounds. The goal of interdisciplinary research is a harmoni-
zation of diverse thematic contents according to the cognitive level that 
is proper to each one of them. Consequently, the incorporation of dis-
ciplinary results in interdisciplinarity requires a delicate methodologi-
cal discernment to avoid the research to conclude in naïve concordanc-
es, or in extrapolate statements that lack scientific rigor outside the field 
in which they were formulated. In this sense, interdisciplinarity differs 
from multidisciplinary research, on the one hand, because its objective 
is to achieve an integrated vision, and, on the other hand, it differs from 
transdisciplinary research because it avoids unifying the disciplines in-
volved at a more general level.
According to Andersen (2016), specialty, discipline, or also subdis-
cipline is a community of scientists with highly similar expertise pos-
sessing basically the same set of cognitive resources that enable them to 
identify mostly the same problems and the same methods for their so-
lution (p. 2). Miles MacLeod (2018) claims that, because specialization 
seeks to solve specific sets of problems in specific ways, a disciplinary vi-
sion makes it “difficult to see how another cognitive domain operates ef-
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fectively and efficiently in order to coordinate practices across domains, 
just as it makes it difficult to vary practices along the dimensions inter-
disciplinary work might require” (p. 716). This difficulty often leads to 
a certain impoverishment of one’s own mental world, which psycholo-
gists have called hypocognition, with negative consequences for interper-
sonal and social relations (Wu and Dunning 2018).
MacLeod (2018) notes that studies on interdisciplinary research do not 
usually focus on its cognitive challenges, and in general we agree with 
him, but there are some remarkable exceptions. Andersen’s proposal, for 
example, considers the degree of cognitive convergence and divergence 
as well as the degree of epistemic dependence among collaborators as the 
key dimensions for understanding the structure of contemporary science 
(Andersen 2016). Against this backdrop, she also describes and analyses 
four ideal types of research activities: the disciplinary legend (cognitive 
convergence and epistemic independence), the disciplinary division of la-
bour (cognitive convergence and epistemic dependence), the interdisci-
plinary division of labour (cognitive divergence and epistemic depend-
ence), and the omniscient genius (cognitive divergence and epistemic 
independence).
Analysing her ideal type of interdisciplinary division of labour, An-
dersen (2016) remarks that the “acquisition of the basic elements of the 
cognitive resources from another domain required for interlocking ex-
pertise implies some degree of simplification” (p. 4). Thus, when “the var-
ious contributions merely need to be juxtaposed there may be less mutual 
dependence between collaborators and only need for interlocking exper-
tise on some isolated points” (p. 6). Nevertheless, when the individual 
contributions “derive from the application of divergent sets of cognitive 
resources, this requires additional interlocking expertise” (p. 6).
In our opinion, this point is the main difference between multidisci-
plinary and interdisciplinary research. The complex interaction of meth-
odologies is not a  relevant problem in multidisciplinary work because 
such work aims only to combine results from different sources to obtain 
conclusions. On the contrary, the requirement of important simplifica-
tions and interlocking expertise is a great challenge for interdisciplinary 
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research to obtain an integrated vision. Such a vision requires the recog-
nition that a plurality of cognitive methodologies is necessary to grasp 
a complex reality that has multiple dimensions of analysis.
2. What is the epistemic justification of the plurality 
of methodologies involved in interdisciplinary research?
The answer to this question is, at first glance, simple: The human be-
ing knows in many ways. Nevertheless, properly developing the content 
of this response requires a deep epistemic clarification. The vast litera-
ture of pluralism in the sciences is itself a testament to the epistemic im-
portance of diverse methodologies not only across disciplines but even 
within the same field (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006; Lombardi and 
Ransanz 2011; Chang 2012). 
Alister McGrath (2019) concludes his book, The Territories of Human 
Reason, noting the need for an ambitious explanation that could recon-
nect many fragmentary disciplinary insights to attain a cohesive account 
of our world. For him, it would be “to develop […] a grand theory of human 
rationality, which is capable of accommodating such divergences across 
disciplines, and allowing them to be seen within a greater whole” (p. 225).
Among the attempts made in this direction, the work of the Span-
ish philosopher Leonardo Polo (1984–1996) stands out. According to Polo 
(1987), knowledge has two dimensions that fit perfectly with each oth-
er: One is the cognitive act (methodical dimension), and the other is the 
content known (thematic dimension). Thus, knowledge “is a unitary the-
matic act, or a theme that unitarily is an act” (p. 87). In other words, no 
theme appears without accounting for the intellectual method that leads 
to its consideration, and there is no intellectual act that does not delimit 
its theme in a precise manner. In his proposal, Polo discerns a diversity of 
cognitive acts, affirming that no cognitive level can be considered abso-
lute. Vanney (2008) earlier discussed that a methodical-thematic plural-
ism such as Polo’s allows us to lay the bases for establishing a congruent 
epistemic justification of the variety of scientific methodologies. 
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I n our view, both the diversity of cognitive acts and the requisite me-
thodical-thematic adjustment allow a more in-depth analysis of the dis-
tinction among multidisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and interdisciplinary 
research. Multidisciplinary studies recognize a disciplinary diversity of 
methods and themes, i.e., the plurality of methodologies allow access to 
a certain type of knowledge. Nevertheless, because their results are lim-
ited to juxtaposing the thematic content of different cognitive values, they are 
unable to provide a unified vision. By contrast, transdisciplinary propos-
als promote the application of a unique integrative methodology at a meta 
level, allowing access to general knowledge with homogeneous cognitive 
value; but they do so at the cost of losing the distinctions between dis-
ciplines. Finally, interdisciplinary research recognizes the existence of 
a plurality of methodologies toward – thematic– knowledge of a complex mul-
tidimensional reality. 
Returning to the question that guides this section, it is possible to con-
clude that the plurality of cognitive methodologies involved in interdis-
ciplinary research obtains its ultimate justification in the cognitive rich-
ness of the human being who can exercise his or her rationality in many 
ways. This, in turn, correlates with a corresponding complexity of reality, 
which resists being described by a single method. Now, some individuals 
exercise specific mental operations more intensively than others. Beyond 
the basis of a certain natural predisposition, this preferred way of think-
ing is due to specific cognitive resources that are developed during early 
training in the profession, promoting the preferential use of some mental 
operations over others.
Specialization is good and necessary. Nevertheless, when a  specific 
manner of disciplinary thinking is totalized, new risks of possible mis-
takes appear such as epistemic trespassing. In an excellent article, Nathan 
Ballantyne (2019) defines epistemic trespassers as “thinkers who have 
competence or expertise to make good judgments in one field but move 
to another field where they lack competence –and pass judgment, never-
theless” (p. 1). While undertaking cross-field efforts to enhance the un-
derstanding of fundamental questions, epistemic trespass is inevitable. 
Yet, a rigorous investigation demands that we do not trespass alone. We 
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agree with Ballantyne’s suggestion: “trespassing is a problem for individ-
ual thinkers, but it points toward social solution” (p. 25). Conducting in-
terdisciplinary research alone is very risky. It is safer to perform this type 
of work with others.
3. Joint attention: A cognitive approach to interdisciplinary 
research teamwork
 According to the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation of the 
OECD (Apostel et al. 1972), “an interdisciplinary group consists of per-
sons trained in different fields of knowledge (disciplines) with different 
concepts, methods, and data and terms organized into a common effort 
on a common problem with continuous intercommunication among the 
participants from the different disciplines” (p. 25–26). That is, because 
a fruitful interaction between team researchers is necessary for the pro-
duction of knowledge (Lattuca 2002), we should expect to find the rele-
vant locus for examining such cognition-generating interactions within 
the field of social cognition.
 Hence, a subject that may be exceptionally pertinent to this study is 
what psychologists call shared attention or joint attention, which involves 
two or more persons who share a common object of attention. Such activ-
ities are especially obvious in the development of the majority of young 
children, manifested in activities such as gaze-following, pointing, tak-
ing turns, and imitative behaviours. Many of these activities happen in 
the context of varieties of interpersonal play, for example, dancing. 
Given that children spend so much time in such activities and given 
also that a lack of such engagement is often a cause of concern,4 the study 
of joint attention has become a topic of considerable interest among many 
developmental psychologists, evolutionary psychologists, and, more re-
cently, philosophers and theologians interested in intersubjectivity (Ei-
lan et al. 2005, Seemann 2012, Metcalfe and Terrace 2013). Plausible ar-
4 For example, numerous studies indicate the deficit of joint attention as a differential 
element of autistic spectrum disorder (Adamson et al. 2019).
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guments have recently been advanced that joint attention plays a crucial 
role in human cognitive, social, emotional and linguistic development.5
Although the experience of joint attention is commonplace, a satisfac-
tory and precise definition is nevertheless challenging. Some psycholo-
gists as Butterworth (1991) have defined joint attention as the simple abil-
ity to follow the gaze of another person or “looking where someone else 
is looking” (p. 223). This definition accentuates the perceptive stance as 
joint attention specifically means joint visual attention.6 Others, however, 
have proposed a more specific definition, noting that those who share the 
same goal in an interrelation focus not only on the same object but also 
attend to the behaviour of their co-attender to accommodate him or her 
(Tomasello 2014). The practice of a team sport is a good example of the at-
tention paid to the way in which others are performing. In soccer, the per-
son who plays as a goalkeeper not only pays attention to the ball, but also 
to the expression and attitude of the other persons trying to score a goal.
For this paper, we have adopted a definition advanced by Peter Hobson 
(2005) who conducted many studies of the behaviour of typical and atyp-
ical children. In Hobson’s words, joint attention implies that one should 
“share awareness of the sharing of the focus, something that often entails 
sharing an attitude towards the thing or event in question” (p. 185). Both 
commonplace experience, and this definition, draw attention to an align-
ment of stance between two persons in joint attention, an alignment that 
Naomi Eilan (2005) referred to as a “meeting of minds”, (p. 1).
 Following Hobson, Axel Seemann (2007) uses a  similar definition, 
specifically, that “instances of joint attention to an object are character-
ized not only by subjects’ joint focus on an object, but typically also by an 
alignment of their respective subjective attitudes” (p. 228). According to 
Seeman, this joint attention is also the context within which there is an 
emergence of the “we” perspective. This perspective is not produced by 
5 Carpendale and Lewis (2006) even stated “that human forms of cognition are built on 
the capacity to engage with other people’s attention. This provides the foundation for 
language and forms of cognition resulting from the internalization of communicative 
interaction” (p. 253).
6 Several empirical studies, such as (Emery et al. 1997), have operationalized joint atten-
tion in this way. 
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a specific interrelation between the perspectives of the “I”, but it is con-
stituted on a more primitive level, making possible the joint search of ob-
jectives, goals and desires. 
Once there is this intersubjective “we” perspective, there is the pos-
sibility of what can be called joint action.7 Again, according to Seemann, 
“the capacity to engage in this mode of action can be seen as a particular 
kind of knowledge: a practical skill that enables jointly engaged persons 
to act together” (p. 229). To explain what makes the joint action possible, 
Seemann notes that different schools of thought focus on diverse aspects 
of the jointness-enabling psychological states: joint attention (perceptu-
al focus), collective intentionality (intentional focus), and common knowl-
edge (epistemic focus). He argues, however, that the perceptual aspect en-
joys a privileged status and can be easily invoked to understand the other 
two.8 Hence, Seemann, along with others,9 considers the phenomenon of 
joint attention to be the primary and the most appropriate starting point 
for explaining joint action.
Given that research team work is a kind of joint action (an intellec-
tual one), the analysis above suggests that we should look to joint atten-
tion as the primary and most important starting point for understanding 
successful instances of such work. There seems to be a clear parallelism: 
there is a common object of attention, specifically, the area under com-
mon investigation, and there are two or more people commonly attend-
ing. This parallelism can then be applied both to multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary research, although differently in each case. 
In the above section, we noted that two dimensions of knowledge can 
be distinguished: the thematic dimension and the methodical dimension. 
Following this distinction, in multidisciplinary work we may understand 
7 It should be noted that accounts of joint attention and joint action remain somewhat 
difficult to interpret and relate at the present time as the studies of joint attention and 
joint action have formed surprisingly independent literatures (Milward and Carpenter 
2018).
8 The relationship between joint attention and common knowledge is analyzed in 
(Campbell 2005, Peacocke 2005).
9 Böckler and Sebanz (2013), for example, claim that joint action and joint attention are 
“tightly linked in social interaction. In fact, successful joint action crucially depends 
on joint attention” (p. 208).
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that joint attention implies that researchers share the awareness of shar-
ing disciplinary content. That is, in multidisciplinary research knowledge 
is shared in its thematic dimension. 
In interdisciplinary work, however, there is or should be a special and 
deeper kind of joint attention involving a shared awareness of sharing the 
cognitive process of knowledge. When one shares intellectual work with 
a researcher from another discipline one also learns, to a certain extent, 
to think in the way he or she does. That is, in interdisciplinary research 
knowledge is shared in its methodical dimension, not only in its thematic 
dimension. This specific shared awareness deserves a special name. We 
shall call it joint intellectual attention.
O’Madagain and Tomasello (2019) consider “joint attention to men-
tal content” to be a process that operates on a second level, transforming 
the simpler joint attention of which infants and apes are capable into the 
mature process in which adults engage. We claim that something similar 
happens with joint intellectual attention. Yet, while “joint attention to 
mental content” regards to the thematic dimension of knowledge, joint 
intellectual attention regards to the methodical one. 
The experience of working interdisciplinarily with several teams of sci-
entists and humanists over the last ten years – which culminated in the 
publication of the book ¿Determinismo o indeterminismo? mentioned earli-
er – has shown us that, in successful interdisciplinary groups, researchers 
are intellectually moved by others to think in ways in which they are not 
accustomed. This intellectual movement stimulates previously latent and 
undeveloped modes of rationality, associated with intellectual habits that 
are unusual in each researcher’s own disciplinary field. This notion of be-
ing “moved” by others in a non-physical manner has already been noted. 
Andrew Pinsent (2012) argues that the phenomenon of joint attention is 
particularly correlated with “the ability to be ‘moved’ by others and to re-
late to others in a specifically second-personal sense” (p. 49). If we refer 
this consideration to interdisciplinary research, we may say that, when ac-
ademics with diverse disciplinary backgrounds sustain a joint intellectual 
attention in the course of an investigation, they mutually motivate each 
other to think in ways different from their own. This awakening of latent 
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cognitive capacities does not occur as a result of systematic training, but 
rather as a result of thinking together.
To summarize, in interdisciplinary exchange between, for instance, 
science and philosophy, scientists do not merely contribute with data and 
theorizations and philosophers with integrated understandings and con-
ceptual clarifications. The core of truly interdisciplinary research requires 
not only the learning of new content from a different discipline but also 
the learning of new ways of thinking. By sharing the awareness of shared 
ways of thinking, interdisciplinary researchers are moved to consider top-
ics with methodologies different than their own. Openness to the ways 
in which other researchers think requires leaving the intellectual sphere 
where each one operates with confidence. It is an effort that is rewarded 
with an expansion of one’s own rationality. This capacity for openness is 
latent in every person and is never lost. It corresponds to human nature 
and is rooted in a deep desire for truth that is found in everyone. In this 
way, interdisciplinary work enriches researchers’ cognitive resources and 
corrects the typical hypocognition of individual approaches.10
4. Intellectual dispositions or virtues fostered 
by joint intellectual attention
 Joint attention has important consequences for the development of social 
cognition in young children. In the same way, just as ordinary joint at-
tention accompanies the biological development of the person, joint in-
tellectual attention requires a sufficiently prolonged time for maturation.
In this section, we will propose three parallelisms between ordinary 
joint attention and joint intellectual attention that will make it possible 
to discern a series of epistemic dispositions – or intellectual virtues – that 
consolidate the second-person relatedness among researchers. They are 
thus highly relevant for collaborative intellectual work in general, and 
10 Andersen and Wagenknecht (2013), for example, argue, that “knowledge resulting 
from interdisciplinary collaboration builds to varying degrees on shared mental mod-
els and conceptual structures and is therefore possessed to varying degrees by individ-
ual group members and the group as a whole” (p. 1896).
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specially for the successful performance of an interdisciplinary team in 
particular.
F irst, the phenomenon of joint attention was initially studied by de-
velopmental psychologists interested in understanding the preverbal and 
early verbal development of vocabulary. Tomasello (1999), for example, 
explained that children “learn new words best in joint attentional scenes 
that are socially shared with others” (p. 109–110). Similarly, we suggest 
that joint intellectual attention allows a gradual construction of a com-
mon interdisciplinary language among scholars with different expertise. 
Such a language is richer than that of individual researchers; however, it 
is not based on the mere sum of technical terms but rather on acknowl-
edgement of the different meanings that the same word can have in di-
verse disciplinary fields. Acquiring this common language is not a minor 
issue, but the first absolutely necessary step for interdisciplinary work.
Se cond, human beings are capable of assuming perspectives different 
from their own. Thus, they can understand how others perceive, think 
and feel. In the mature adult, this capacity can even go beyond the mere 
determination of a person’s point of view at a given moment as he or she 
can also understand that the same thing can be interpreted according to 
the point of view of a person’s different dimensions (vision-spatial, epis-
temic, conceptual, and affective). Psychologists have claimed that to de-
velop perspective-taking, human children first learn about perspectives 
within the context of joint attentional engagement (Moll and Meltzoff 
2011, 2012). Similarly, we suggest that joint intellectual attention helps 
researchers to recognize the different approaches that frame their con-
tributions. This implies, in turn, the recognition that the diverse meth-
odologies used in this type of research can also refer to different dimen-
sions of the same reality.
Third, several philosophers have also noted that joint attention plays 
a fundamental role in grasping the other’s mind, and it is thus a capac-
ity that enables understanding other people (Heal 2005, Roessler 2005). 
While much research on joint attention assumes a cognitive perspective, 
Hobson (2005) suggested that joint attention is based on “a special form 
of interpersonal engagement involving feelings” (p. 188). He also empha-
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sized the importance of joint attention in the development of the inter-
personal coordination of affectivity (Hobson 1989). Böckler and Sebanz 
(2013) explain that “social-affective accounts have stressed the role of 
sharing attention for the development of understanding others as having 
mental states. According to these accounts, joint attention, by fostering 
the sharing of emotional states, also underlies the development of joint 
action capabilities” (p. 211). Similarly, we suggest that joint intellectual 
attention contributes to an appreciation of, and mutual respect among, 
the members of the research team, promoting an attitude of openness and 
trust among them that consolidates the desire to learn from others.
Moreover, ordinary human experience also commends the need to pro-
tect this attitude of openness and trust from the kind of self-sufficiency and 
closure associated with intellectual pride. Pride blocks relationships with 
others that enable one to be moved to have new insights (Pinsent (2012), 
77–82). By contrast, in order to collaborate interdisciplinarily it must be as-
sumed that one person cannot encompass everything. This disposition lays 
the foundation for the epistemic virtue of intellectual humility. As Craig 
Boyd (2017) has observed, “intellectual humility requires more than the 
simple application of the rules of logic, but also a perspective that demands 
the recognition of one’s own limitations and prejudices” (p. 173). There-
fore, the virtue of intellectual humility guarantees an attitude of constant 
openness to learn something new, both from one’s own discipline and from 
others. It is an essential epistemic virtue to avoid the risks of hypocogni-
tion and epistemic intrusion, and to continually broaden our knowledge.
5. Final discussion
 In this paper, we claim that if an interdisciplinary research team aspires 
to work in collaboration, it is essential for researchers to jointly focus 
their attention on a common subject, establishing a second-person relat-
edness among them. In our view, creative pluralism in interdisciplinary 
research requires to share the way of thinking of others, and not only to 
learn new content from different fields. Only in this manner can interdis-
ciplinary exchange succeed.
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In this final discussion, we want to consider some practical conse-
quences of the cognitive approach to interdisciplinary research proposed 
in this paper.
Consequences for education: As mentioned above, collaborative work is 
the best approach to integrating, coordinating or harmonizing discipli-
nary information to allow the most fully possible overall representation 
of nature. As in any collaborative process, joint intellectual attention not 
only promotes but also requires some attitudinal and ethical dispositions 
in researchers such as appreciation, mutual respect, openness and confi-
dence. These dispositions are habits that must be rooted in people from 
an early age. Promoting these virtues in children and adolescents is, in 
our opinion, the best way to educate future interdisciplinary research-
ers. Considering the difference between interdisciplinarity and multidis-
ciplinarity noted above, it is easily concluded that interdisciplinarity is 
not encouraged by providing students with information on multiple areas 
of knowledge but by preparing young people such that they can interact 
with specialists in different subjects in the future. Preparation for inter-
disciplinary research should focus more on openness to others than on 
opening to multiple themes.
Consequences for teaching programs: Interdisciplinary integration re-
quires that each member of the research team possesses solid prior disci-
plinary training and experience. Only when scholars have in-depth exper-
tise in their own discipline can they share their cognitive resources with 
others during an investigation that requires joint intellectual attention. 
That is, because interdisciplinary exchange compels a demanding second-
personal cognitive process, it cannot be accomplished if each researcher 
has not previously achieved cognitive development in a specialty. There-
fore, it is easily concluded that the premature promotion of a variety of 
simultaneous studies at a superficial level will not be the best approach 
to developing interdisciplinarity. If young people have not yet cognitive-
ly matured in some discipline, encouraging a mixed group of students to 
perform a superficial synthesis about a plurality of ideas will only result in 
juxtaposition without unity.
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Consequences for researchers: Because some people are unable to under-
take the effort of joint intellectual attention, interdisciplinary research is 
not for everybody. Each individual must work in the manner in which he or 
she works best. “Autistic” researchers (or investigators who metaphorical-
ly lack an integrative framework in their research approach) work best in 
disciplinary research. Doing so, however, does not necessarily imply a loss 
because, as noted above, interdisciplinary research is grounded in discipli-
nary research. There is no “interdiscipline” without disciplines.
Consequences for project planning: Because interdisciplinary research is 
intellectual work, it is not a simple consequence of a voluntary decision 
but rather a result of an intellectual motivation. For a group of researchers 
to undertake the challenge of joint intellectual attention, it is insufficient 
to proceed based only on their decisions to join a project. Offering them 
an intellectually thought-provoking proposal that stimulates their intel-
ligence and encourages them to overcome the difficulties inherent in in-
terdisciplinary work is absolutely necessary. In this sense, developments in 
educational policy that promote interdisciplinary research are necessary 
to facilitate the work of existing interdisciplinary teams. Nevertheless, the 
motivating force that gives birth to new projects will not come from them. 
The origin of a novel collaborative project mainly requires an inspiring 
idea that encourages others. Another important issue to consider in project 
planning is that achieving joint intellectual attention among specialists 
takes time, as it does with the acquisition of any intellectual virtue. A first 
collaborative project can be a good initial trigger; however, it will probably 
be necessary to maintain joint work on several projects until it is achieved.
We want to finish this article with a methodological comment. In this 
work, we presented an analysis of interdisciplinary research that derives 
from the concept of joint intellectual attention. This notion is mainly 
based on our practical experience and developed gradually over the last 
ten years from observations of the interdisciplinary work of several teams 
of scientists and humanists. That work revealed the importance of sec-
ond-personal relatedness to interdisciplinary research. 
The theoretical support of joint intellectual attention in this paper is 
drawn from an analogy with joint attention in the psychology of joint ac-
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tion. By suggesting possible extensions of theoretical concepts and ideas, 
analogies are widely recognized as playing an important heuristic role, as 
aids to discovery and by guiding conceptual development (Bartha 2019). 
Yet, analogies also have limits. The psychological literature on joint at-
tention mainly deals with very low-level tasks such as watching the same 
object, while joint intellectual attention deals with academic research, on 
the other side of the cognitive spectrum. The use of analogy in this work 
does not pretend to fill this gap, but to seek the foundations of interdis-
ciplinary research in the more basic disposition that enables the develop-
ment of interpersonal relationships.
Furthermore, though joint intellectual attention involves both a moti-
vational and a success component, as do intellectual virtues on a respon-
sibilist perspective (Zagzebski 1996), this disposition could be conceived 
as an intellectual virtue of intellectual endeavours in general. If so, the 
case of interdisciplinary research would be just a paradigmatic context in 
which we could see the benefits of forming and cultivating it. To go fur-
ther in this direction, however, would be the topic of other studies. 
Moreover, because the ideas proposed in this paper have significant 
practical consequences, especially for decision making in educational in-
stitutions, it would be useful if joint intellectual attention could also be 
empirically tested by cognitive psychologists. Such testing would consti-
tute in itself a good interdisciplinary research.
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